Iran’s Own Internal Debate Offers the Surest Path to Peace

If Iran were to settle the nuclear weapons issue completely with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the world powers, Iranians would find access to the West becoming much easier. That is precisely what the hard-line clergy in Tehran and Qom fear most, and might explain the cautious response from Tehran to the recent IAEA proposal. Such contact brings the kind of socioeconomic, intellectual, and political diversity of which fundamentalist systems like that in Iran are most wary. As long as differences with the United States and its allies continue, the militant clerics benefit from their country’s relative isolation.

So why should settling the nuclear issue be on Iran’s list of priorities at all — if not for the clerics then for others in power, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?

Ahmadinejad’s regime has been obliged to negotiate by external pressure, mainly from Western nations concerned about Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities.

More important, there is growing internal momentum as well, generated by Iranian citizens’ desires to normalize relations with the West, especially with the United States. Iran’s burgeoning middle class have seen little benefit from religious rule. They now yearn for the economic, social, and educational opportunities that open contact will provide.

It is useful to recall that Ahmadinejad is not a mullah, nor are his supporters and advisers. And they too have come to realize that the rule of the ayatollah is far from beneficial. Ahmadinejad has begun criticizing powerbrokers who “run to Qom for every decision.” His presidential chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei suggested “the era of religious sovereignty is over.” So the executive branch of Iran’s government has begun to diverge from the theocrats by understanding they will benefit from enhanced interaction with Western nations.

As these administrators sought recently to redress some of their nation’s underlying problems, militant mullahs have denounced them for including women in the national cabinet and other leadership roles, for negotiating Iran’s uranium stockpile with the UN Security Council and the IAEA, and for not bowing to clerical edicts on matters great and small. Yet Iran’s president and his supporters have followed Iranians from many walks of life by quietly and publicly questioning and challenging the theocratic status quo. Outside clerical ranks, it is now commonplace to ask why minds and bodies are captive to one particular — and peculiar — interpretation of Islam.

Not surprisingly the Iranian government has begun to negotiate with the United States and EU, albeit hesitantly. As the proposal tendered by Iran’s foreign ministry to the UN Security Council in September suggests, Iran seeks a sustained, visible, positive role for itself within the community of nations. Iranians aspire to thrive economically and internationally through partnerships with western nations, while they gradually resolve sociopolitical and religious dilemmas at home.

Of course, even as many Iranians strive for greater links with the West, the nation’s vexed history with the United States and Britain, plus its fundamentalist and isolationist factions tend to support a more hard-line approach. It is not just certain clerics that oppose reconciliation. Some Iranians, irrespective of sectarian and ideological dispositions, question the prudence of granting any other nation sway over aspects of national security. Yet others look backward and fear foreigners will return to exploit Iran economically as happened in the past.

Thus Iran’s hesitation in accepting the IAEA proposal, which would hinder the path to weaponization of nuclear material, should not be seen as a termination of negotiations or a rejection of engagement. It is more an indication of the internal Iranian debate over how reconciliation with the West can occur, which security compromises Iran should make in that process, and what immediate benefits would accrue to Iranians.

The West can assist Iran in its internal struggles. Rather than narrowly focused negotiations and largely ineffective sanctions against Iran and its citizens, the West should emphasize the multifaceted and lasting benefits of cooperation — not only on the nuclear issue but on the larger quandaries of Iran’s internal needs and international roles. Eventually Iran may compromise on its nuclear standoff as it regains confidence and realizes threats are the least effective path to recognition.

Iran has proved in the past, before the Islamic Republic, to be not only a cultural and political stalwart but a leader among the world’s nations. It can be once more, for the good of all. Important decisions are being made, and only Iranians can ensure their leaders choose wisely. The West can help show the way.



Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. Copyright YaleGlobal 2009, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization.